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ABSTRACT 
Increasingly Internet of Things (IoT) devices are being woven into the 
fabric of our physical world. With this rapidly expanding pervasive 
deployment of IoT devices, and supporting infrastructure, we are fast 
approaching the point where the problem of IoT based cyber-security 
attacks is a serious threat to industrial operations, business activity and 
social interactions that leverage IoT technologies. The number of 
threats and successful attacks against connected systems using IoT 
devices and services are increasing. The Internet of Things has several 
characteristics that present technological challenges to traditional 
cyber-security techniques.  
The Internet of Things requires a novel and dynamic security 
paradigm. This paper describes the challenges of securing the Internet 
of Things. A discussion detailing the state-of-the-art of IoT security is 
presented. A novel approach to security detection using streaming data 
analytics to classify and detect security threats in their early stages is 
proposed. Implementation methodologies and results of ongoing work 
to realise this new IoT cyber-security technique for threat detection are 
presented.   
Keywords 
Internet of Things, Cyber Security, Streaming Analytics, Device 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The recent emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT) as a novel and 
powerful platform for services and decision-making [1, 2], have made 
it one of the fastest growing technologies Today [3]. This new 
disruptive paradigm of a pervasive physically connected world, will 
have a huge impact on social interactions, business and industrial 
activities. It is predicted that the IoT will gradually permeate all aspects 
of modern human life [4]. In this new connected world, the fine-
grained monitoring of activity and processes involves the storage of 
vast amounts of sensitive data and information about citizens, 
organizations and their activities.  
Given the growing pervasiveness of connected sensing enabled 
devices, and consequently the increasing accessibility of highly 
sensitive data and information, the need for robust security has never 
been greater [5,6]. The security challenges presented by the 
deployment of connected resource-constrained devices is well 
understood, and has been the focus of research for many years [7]. 
However, off-the-shelf and deployment ready practical solutions to 
securing constrained and connected sensing devices are not readily 
available. Prior to the recent IoT revolution, there has not existed an 
urgency for the employment of robust security measures in similar type 
devices and systems. This lack of urgency has bred a culture of poor 
security practices within IoT predecessors such as wireless sensor 
networks (WSN) and SensorWebs, and consequently their descendant 
IoT systems. 
Already we are beginning to see the net result of poor security in 
already deployed IoT networks. The Dyn cyberattack on the 21st of 
October 2016 [8] saw a series of massive Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attacks. These attacks were performed using a Mirai-bot based 
botnet [9]. It is estimated that the attackers used more than 100,000 
infected IoT end-points to generate traffic rates of up to 1.2 Tbps to 
achieve the DDoS attack [10]. This attack highlighted a new urgency 
for more sophisticated protection systems to secure IoT networks and 
systems against threats and vulnerabilities. These attacks also 
highlighted the complacency the IoT community has employed when 
considering security during IoT deployments.  
The Mirai botnet attack has brought the issue of IoT security into 
the public domain. However, the number of threats had been rising 
daily [11] prior to the Mirai botnet attack. Also of note is the increase 
in sophistication of the methods and tools employed by an ever-
increasing number of would be attackers [12,13]. These threats now 
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raise serious questions as to the real dangers faced by individuals and 
organizations when using IoT technologies. Failure to act could see the 
vision of a connected world severely limited and represent a missed 
opportunity for new business models and revenue streams. 
In this paper, we present the initial results of ongoing work to 
address the security challenges presented by an IoT paradigm. 
Leveraging innovative streaming analytical techniques, we show how 
detecting events in traffic feature distributions can allow the 
classification of abnormal behaviour within an IoT network. 
This paper is organised as follows: Firstly, we present a discussion 
leading to a definition of an Internet of Things system (Section 2). 
Section 2.3 provides a brief overview of security considerations for 
IoT. Section 3 provides a review of the current techniques within the 
field of unsupervised network anomaly detection, with the state of the 
art presented in Section 3.1. A novel approach applying these broad 
techniques to contribute to IoT-appropriate security detection and 
resolution approaches is presented in Section 4. In Section 5 we draw 
conclusions based on the results of Section 4 and detail further work.  
2 THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
2.1 Defining the Internet of Things 
The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) states in RFC 7452 the 
following: 
 
“The term Internet of Things (IoT) denotes a trend where a large 
number of embedded devices employ communication services offered 
by the Internet protocols. Many of these devices, often called smart 
objects, are not directly operated by humans, but exist as components 
in buildings of vehicles, or are spread out in the environment” [14]. 
 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) notes that a smart 
object will typically have significant constraints in terms of power 
supply, memory, communication bandwidth and on-board processing 
power [15]. References [15-17] all note that the interconnection of the 
physical world with the virtual world is the focus of IoT specification.  
Generally, in the literature what is found are non-contradictory 
definitions of IoT. However, definition attempts are somewhat high-
level and abstract to ensure applicability to diverse use-cases. This 
disparity among a definition for IoT can confuse any discourse 
amongst IoT interest groups.  Similar obstacles to meaningful 
discussions were apparent during the emergence of the concepts of net 
neutrality and cloud computing, which hindered community consensus 
on associated topics of interest [18]. In any case, the arrival of a global 
consensus on an IoT definition will follow the habitual path of 
standardization; this is beginning to emerge through the work of 
International standards organizations such as ISO [19].  
Here, when referring to the “Internet of Things” and “IoT” we adopt 
the following broad definition. IoT refers to: 
 
“the extension of network connectivity and computing capability to 
objects, devices, sensors and items not normally considered to be 
computers. These “smart objects” require minimal human intervention 
to generate, exchange and consume data; they often feature 
connectivity to remote data collection, analysis and management 
capabilities” [20]. 
 
While many models of IoT include non-IP data flows and thus do 
not route data via the Internet, the authors assume that any data 
generated or processed from IoT/smart nodes will pass through an IoT 
bridge and be hosted along an IP-based publicly accessible network. 
For example, we assume that a 6LoWPAN Border Router (6LBR) or 
equivalent would be an intrinsic part of any IoT system.  
2.2 IoT Security 
IoT network operators and cloud service providers host network flows, 
which exhibit a myriad of “unusual” behaviors and events. Within the 
bounds of these unusual events may lie furtive activities with malicious 
objectives. Eliciting the event patterns of a maligned activity is not a 
trivial task. The volatile nature of the IoT environment makes 
discovery difficult. Within an IoT system there may be a high degree 
of volatile behavior. This volatility merely represents the digital 
artifacts of a chaotic physical world augmented with sensing and 
communication technologies. Human-behaviour tends to exhibit 
volatile behavior, thus a resultant and continuous digital stream from 
consumers, smart-things and machines may capture a new and normal 
behaviour as a seemingly unusual event.  
While leveraging the ability to analyse IoT behaviour from network 
traffic, the challenge in an IoT environment is sorting the abnormal 
(but valid behavior) from that of a security threat. To ensure the correct 
response to behavioral changes, a sophisticated and dynamic behaviour 
classification regime must be employed to elicit the true nature of IoT 
data streams and resultant network flows.  
It is important to note that an IoT security environment is not that 
different from any other non-constrained network. Consequently, 
many good lessons can be learned from traditional approaches and 
used as the basis for an IoT relevant and appropriate solution.  
3 ANOMALY CLASSIFICATION AND DEVICE 
DISCOVERY 
Given the diversity of IoT sensors, devices and resulting data-streams, 
the principal challenge in automatically detecting and classifying 
anomalies is to un-restrict events and activities and rely on the ability 
to mine these events and identify anomalies that are considered a 
security threat. Such anomalies can span a vast range of events: from 
network abuse (examples include denial-of-service attacks, scans, 
worms) to equipment failures (such as outages) to unusual customer 
behaviour (e.g., sudden changes in demand, flash crowds, high volume 
flows), and even to new, previously unknown events.  
In the field of anomaly behaviour detection applied to the IoT 
space, two additional and considerable complications have to be 
considered. Firstly, IoT covers a huge range of different devices all 
forming an ecosystem where the line between normal and abnormal is 
usually blurred. Secondly, anomalies are a moving target. It is difficult 
to precisely and permanently define a set of anomalies within IoT 
network behavior, especially in the case of malicious anomalies. New 
network anomalies will continue to arise over time; so, an anomaly 
detection system should avoid being restricted to any predefined set of 
anomalies. 
The goal of this paper is to contribute towards a system that fulfills 
these criteria. We seek methods that can classify sensor traffic in the 
IoT space and detect a diverse and general set of network anomalies, 
and to do so with a high detection rate and a low false alarm rate. 
Furthermore, rather than classifying anomalies into a set of rigid and 
static classes (defined historically) we seek to evaluate the anomalies 
from the data following a fuzzy unsupervised approach that allows the 
discovery of a comparative similarity index between new and already 
identified abnormalities.  
We base our work on the observation that despite their diversity, 
most traffic anomalies share a common characteristic: they induce a 
change in the distribution of the generated network traffic fields. Our 
hypothesis is that examining distributions of network traffic features 
yields considerable diagnostic power in both the detection and 
classification of a large set of anomalies. 
Next, we present an overview and background to the state-of-art 
and current trends in the relevant areas that inform our methodologies.  
3.1 State of the Art and Related Work 
In recent times, the use of IP network flows based anomaly detection 
has been gaining considerable attention, and has been the focus of 
increased study. The explosion of data flows and speeds across 
networks has driven this increased interest. Where previously, 
individual packet inspection would occur in real-time to aid detection 
of anomalies, this becomes unwieldly at high data rates. A flow based 
approach has emerged as a scalable and timely approach. The flow 
based approach does not seek to replace packet inspection, but work as 
a complementary approach for anomaly detection. [21] proposes a 
denial-of-service attack detection architecture for IoT systems. In [21] 
a packet inspection methodology is employed. Our work can 
conceivably complement packet inspection approaches.  
Arising from recent work, successful implementations of anomaly 
detection, based on detecting deviations from what is considered a 
“normal-state” have emerged. Here we present an overview of the 
ongoing work in this field, referred to as unsupervised machine 
learning for network anomaly detection.  
3.2 Network Based Anomaly Detection 
The field of anomaly detection within IP networks can be broken down 
into two main categories: 
 
 Knowledge based detection systems or supervised detection 
systems. 
 Knowledge independent or unsupervised detection systems. 
 
The focus of this paper is the latter; unsupervised. Other approaches 
prevalent within the network anomaly detection community are not 
considered here; due to their reliance on previous or historical results 
of detection activities. We would argue historical data is of limited use, 
or is not readily available in an IoT context. The nature of IoT systems 
mandate the need to directly monitor and measure traffic, and react in 
a dynamic way. In [22] Raza et al. present a hybrid approach to 
intrusion detection within IoT systems. Their work attempts to balance 
a signature approach with an anomaly approach. We seek to focus 
solely on an unsupervised anomaly approach as the need to store 
historical data for signature analysis is not practical in constrained IoT 
networks. 
Zang et al. [23] present a unified anomaly detection framework for 
network anomography. They propose to separate anomaly detection 
into two categories; systems using temporal correlation methods, and 
systems using spatial correlation methods to identify normal traffic. In 
this paper, we adopt Zang et al.’s category definitions within an 
unsupervised approach; where unknown anomalous behaviour rather 
than particular signatures is our focus.  
3.2.1 Temporal correlation methods describe those techniques 
where time is the main driver in the analytics process. In this technique, 
a point-in-time represents a reference point for all analysis operations. 
Anomalous traffic can be separated by performing time-series based 
temporal analysis on the traffic source. Four types of temporal analysis 
are identified in [23], which can be split into two groupings: time-series 
analysis and continuous data observations. 
Time-series analysis associates anomalies with a deviation from a 
predicted behaviours classifier, and is calculated using a distance 
metric from that classifier. Two models are usually employed: Auto-
Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) and deltoids [24]. 
ARIMA models include Exponentially Weighted Moving Average 
(EWMA) and linear exponential smoothing.  
3.2.2 Spatial Correlation Methods. In spatial correlation methods, 
data elements in high dimensional data sets such as the network load 
observations usually have dependencies. The intrinsic dependency 
structure among the data elements can thus be exploited for filtering 
anomalous behaviour by discovering data points that violate the 
normal dependency structure [23]. Here the use of entropy to sum up 
the feature distribution of networks is employed. By using 
unsupervised learning, it is shown that anomalies can be clustered to 
form anomaly classes or cluster vector definitions. The metrics or 
features successively used in these papers are: byte counts in [25], 
packets counts, byte counts and IP flow counts in [26] and entropy 
values for distributions of several features (source IP address, 
destination IP address, source port, and destination port) in [27]. In [28] 
it is shown that entropy based approaches are suitable and effective at 
detecting modern-botnet attacks such as the Mirai-botnet.  
What is clear from the literature is that a multi-detector approach is 
the main conclusion of many of the experiments documented in the 
literature. Major advancements in supervised approaches using a 
combination approach have been reported. However, the more 
complex challenge of unsupervised detection systems using machine 
learning remains an open question [29].  
This work seeks to further the complex field of unsupervised 
learning to allow for the enabling of appropriate feature distribution 
clustering and analysis approaches for an IoT eco-systems. 
Unsupervised advocates work on the assumption that abnormal traffic 
is fundamentally different to the normal traffic structures. However, 
the volatile nature of IoT means that this is not necessarily the case. 
The diagnostic approach described here is intended to ultimately 
overcome this inherent challenge of using unsupervised approaches 
within IoT ecosystems. 
4 EXPERIMENT 
The problem of defining and analysing anomalies purely with data 
observations (unsupervised learning) and the absence of previously 
characterized knowledge, is the focus of much attention within the 
scientific community. The unsupervised school, (the one this work 
belongs to) works on the assumption that abnormal traffic is 
fundamentally different to the normal traffic structures. It is assumed 
that by studying these differences, abnormalities and new knowledge 
can be discovered. However, the reality of the world surrounding us is 
rarely pure and never simple. The consideration of abnormality is tied 
to many circumstances, as the time or the season, that put captivating 
challenges to those in the search of creating a knowledge acquisition 
devices. In the IoT ecosystem, the volatility of the reality push those 
challenges to the next level. The diagnostic system proposed here is 
developed to identify abrupt changes in the individual features and in 
the dependencies of those variables.   
The experiment described here uses a spatio-temporal 
methodology to characterise network behaviours. Once characterised, 
anomalous behaviours can be identified by calculating a 
similarity/distance metric to previously identified behaviours (e.g. 
attacks, intrusions or malfunctioning machinery). The thesis under 
investigation is: through the monitoring of the entropy of variables 
associated with certain network traffic features, combined with a 
modified dispersion coefficient for numerical variables, it is possible 
to generate rich 2D models that capture the nature of the network 
behaviour, referred to as behavioural shapes. These behavioural shapes 
contain verbose visual descriptors of individual feature’s behaviour 
and the dependencies that exist between them. We propose that any 
connected sensor, smart-thing or community of things network flow 
behaviour can be represented using 2D models/behavioural shapes. 
A sliding-window approach is employed to analyse the temporal 
aspect of our methodology. At each time unit (Ti), a behavioural shape 
is produced, calculated using the network data within the last n time 
units. 
 In this experiment, we configured our system to run in intervals of 
30 seconds, however, our system is flexible enough to work with 
different time horizons. Next, the measurements of each window time 
are scaled to unit norm to focus on the dependencies of its dispersions 
rather than its infinite value.  The problem is then restricted to find the 
windows time describing shapes with an abnormal figure compared to 
the rest. The shape form, area and position in the 2d plane will be 
defined by the dispersion values and the dependency between the 
values.  
4.1 Behavioral Shape Calculation 
The central idea of our work is the characterization of any network 
behaviour in 2D shapes. Fig 1 shows how a behavioural shape is 
constructed. A normalisation process is employed to focus on 
dispersion dependencies. 
 
 
Figure 1: Behavioral Shape. The behavioral shape shown is 
constructed through a mix of entropy and dispersion 
measurements. For example, the IP Source entropy in this case is 
0.51, the total_bytes_received dispersion coefficient is 0.29. In the 
example T0 = 30seconds and normal operation is being observed. 
The shape form’s area and position in the 2D plane is defined by 
the dispersion values and the dependency between the values.  
4.1.1 Variable distribution study. In this study, the data from a 
telecom mobile operator (4G network) with IoT devices connected to 
the network is used. Data was read from the SGi interface at the core 
network (EPC). All traffic coming or going to non-IoT devices were 
filtered and removed. IoT traffic is not the only traffic flowing on the 
network therefore, It is safe to assume that changes in the network 
circumstances (e.g. Equipment malfunctioning, or attacks coming 
from non IoT-devices) can impact on the behaviour and performance 
of IoT devices. The following fields, each representing a traffic feature 
were monitored: International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), IP 
Source, IP destination, source TCP port, destination TCP port, 
tcp_retrnsmt_bytes, total_bytes_received, total_bytes_send and 
total_latency. 
These fields are only a sample of the fields that could be monitored. 
Also, data acquired is only a sample of the total data. For this 
experiment, we measured traffic for 4 hours per day over a 7-day 
period. It should be noted that it was not possible to generate security 
attacks as a real live network was used. We therefore conjecture that 
real security attacks could be detected using the proposed method. 
However, real anomalies were found. Those anomalies could be the 
result of sensors malfunctioning, sensors software updates or simply, 
IoT device attacks on a small scale. Lakhina et al. note that:  
 
“The distribution of traffic features is a high-dimensional object 
and so can be difficult to work with directly. However, we can observe 
that in most cases, one can extract very useful information from the 
degree of dispersal or concentration of the distribution the specific 
variables changing its distribution at the same time, compared with 
those which remain stable” [27].  
 
Lakhina et al. found in [27] that in some cases, the fact that a group of 
features were dispersed while others were concentrated is a strong 
indicator, which should be useful both for detecting an anomaly and 
identifying it once it has been detected. 
4.1.2 Entropy. The formula for Entropy is defined in (1) below. 
 
𝐻(𝑥) =  ∑ (
𝑛𝑖
𝑆
𝑁
𝑖=1 )  ∗  log(
𝑛𝑖
𝑆
)   (1) 
 
Where  𝑆 =  ∑ 𝑛𝑖𝑁𝑖=1  , and is the total number of observations. The 
value of sample entropy lies in range [0, log(𝑁)]. The rate of entropy 
is lesser when the class distribution is pure (poor diversity). The rate 
of entropy is larger when the class distribution is impure (large 
diversity). The entropy shows its minimum value 0 when all the items 
of a feature (e.g IP address or port address) are the same; and its 
maximum value log(𝑁), when all the items are different. 
Here entropy is used as a convenient summarily statistic for a 
distribution’s tendency in categorical variables to be concentrated or 
dispersed. We use this metric to build our behavioural shapes. It is 
important to note that entropy is not the only metric that captures a 
distribution’s concentration or dispersal on categorical variables. 
However, we have explored other metrics and find that entropy works 
well for our objectives. 
In this work, we used the entropy of feature distributions 
calculated from network traces counts. However, the temporal 
approach presented in this paper has some implications on the 
usage of the entropy calculations. As we propose a fixed 
temporal length for our sliding window and because the 
network will experience network traffic volume fluctuations 
throughout the day, the value of N (the total number of distinct 
values seen in a window time) will change accordingly. As the 
entropy lies in range [0, log(𝑁)], the value of N will impact the 
entropy value.  
The implications of this effect on our approach are minimal. As we 
scale each value to the unit norm, our approach focuses on the 
relationship between entropies rather than their absolute values. We 
can thus guarantee that similar behaviours will appear to be near to 
each other in this entropy space regardless of the volume of the traffic.  
4.1.3 Dispersion coefficient. In this experiment, we proposed a 
modified dispersion metric applied to numerical variables. The metric 
proposed has been modified to the range [0, 1] and is shown in (2) 
below. 
 
     𝐷(𝑥) = 0.01 ∗  sin−1 (
𝐴𝑣𝑔
√𝑆𝑡𝑑2+𝐴𝑣𝑔2
)             (2) 
 
Where Std is the standard deviation of the sample, Avg is the 
average of the sample the metric proposed here calculates the angle 
created by the standard deviation and the average of the sample. The 
bigger the angle, the smaller the standard deviation in respect to the 
average, and therefore, less disperse the sample. On the contrary, a big 
standard deviation will generate a small angle and consequently a small 
D. 
4.2 Shapes Similarity Concept 
The Euclidean distance between 2 shapes seems to be the most obvious 
resource to measure the distances between shapes and use the resulting 
metric to determinate a normality/ abnormality score for each new 
shape. Euclidean distance is a simple method that can measure the 
distance between 2 individual shapes, however it results in 
inconsistencies for the purpose of this work. For example, in Fig 2, 
shape 1 and shape 2 represent two very different behaviours in a 31-
dimensional window time. Each axis plots the entropy and the 
dispersion for each feature. The Euclidean distance between both 
shapes is 2.6833 (Table 1, 4th column). As can be seen in Fig 2, both 
shapes have same area and describe the same form but they are placed 
in different positions. When both are compared with a 3rd static 
reference 31-dimensional shape, the distance remains the same for both 
(Table 1, columns 1-3).  
 
 
  
Shape 1 Shape 2 
Figure 2: Shown are two different shapes each with 31-dimensions 
representing different behaviours. 
 
Table 1: Euclidean distances study results 
  Ref Point 1 Ref Point 2 Ref Point 3 Point  1 
Point 1 2.03 2.54 1.83 0.00 
Point 2 2.03 2.54 1.83 2.68 
Table 2 Distance obtained by comparing the previously presented 
2 shapes with the 3 reference shapes using the angle based 
projection procedure 
  Ref Point 1 Ref Point 2 Ref Point 3 
Point 1 9.34 9.69 7.85 
Point 2 8.67 10.91 9.19 
 
4.2.1 The angle based projection procedure. To measure the 
changes produced at the feature and feature dependencies level, we 
need a method to capture the following aspects of the shapes: Area, 
Form and Position. We propose a procedure that measures the 
distances of the angles generated by the projection of each feature to 
an origin point 0,0.  Where the Y axis represents the position of the 
variable and the X axis represents the dispersion value. Once the n 
length of sequences of angles are generated, the Euclidian distance is 
calculated with the projected angles generated by the 3 static pre-
defined behavioural shapes Fig 3 & Fig 4. Two reference shapes 
represent antagonistic behaviours with a correlation coefficient of -1; 
covering all of the behavioural spectrum. In practice, this implies that 
any behavioural shape scored far from reference point 1 has a good 
possibility to be similar to reference point 2. Behavioural shapes scored 
equally distant to reference point 1 & 2 have to describe a behaviour 
close to reference 3. This procedure can be considered as a part of the 
family of “projection based dimensionality reduction” procedures, 
with the peculiarity of using 3 references to measure the distances 
(Table 2).  
In theory, this system could reduce any dimensionality space to 3. 
As any other projection based dimensionality reduction system, the 
bigger the dimensionality space, the poorer the accuracy of the 
resulting space. The projected angle is calculated using (3) below.  
 
                        𝐷(𝑥) = sin−1 (
𝑓
√𝑓2+𝑒2
)                   (3) 
 
Where 𝑓  represents the position of the feature and 𝑒  the 
entropy/dispersion.   
 
 
Figure 3: Reference point 1 and 2 describe an antagonistic 
behaviour having a Pearson correlation coefficient of -1.
 Figure 4: 
4.2.2 Detection of anomalies. In addition to the sliding window 
time previously defined, the system manages a second, and larger, 
sliding window time (Macro-Window Time) to measure the sustained 
level of similarity to the 3 predefined behaviours. We tested using two 
different length configurations for the second window time of 2 and 3 
hours respectively. This means that the system will keep a hard copy 
of the behavioural shapes for the last 2 or 3 hours; kept in a FIFO (First 
in First out) manner. The purpose of this is to detect changes in the 
behaviours of variables that could indicate an anomalous behavioural 
change.  
To do so, once we manage a reduced space dataset to 3 dimensions, 
the outlier detection becomes simpler and less computational 
expensive. In our experiments, we used the Chauvenet criterion and 
Euclidian distance to discover outliers in our behaviours. Chauvenet 
measures the probability of any point of being spurious given the 
average and standard deviation values of a data distribution.  
Chauvenet has main limitation that could origin bias, it assumes an 
underlying normal distribution of the data. Future work works 
exploring alternatives should be conducted. 2 main areas are proposed. 
The first is the application of clustering techniques (e.g. Streaming K 
means) to discover outliers. This technique presents the challenges of 
selecting the right number of clusters in an unbounded data set and, the 
right selection of the distance function (e.g. Eucledian, Mahalanobis). 
Nevertheless, any distance based procedure as clustering will face the 
fundamental challenge of deciding what are the acceptable boundaries 
for the clusters. 
The second alternative is the application of autoregressive models 
(e.g. ARMA, ARIMA) to predict the next behaviour and detect the 
anomaly based on the discrepancy of the prediction with the reality. 
The main limitation of this approach is that fundamentally they are not 
unsupervised and required a training phase before they can predict 
results. A very promising area is proposed in 2 where the parameter 
required by ARIMA is automatically discovered from the data. 
Regardless, the method used to qualify anomalies, our work 
demonstrates that by studding the distances to 3 antagonist static 
behaviours, changes in the traffic topology can be captured and 
categorized based on the shape similarity to previously identified 
behaviours.   
5 CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
Network anomaly classification, in the context of IoT systems presents 
many challenges, and is difficult to achieve in practice. The IoT 
paradigm means a lack of historical information coupled with a diverse 
range of deployment scenarios, sensing and connectivity technologies. 
This leads to the need to employ an unsupervised approach to anomaly 
detection. Current unsupervised approaches assume that abnormal 
traffic is fundamentally different to normal traffic structures, this is not 
always the case in an IoT environment. 
This paper demonstrates how treating anomalies as events that alter 
traffic feature distributions yields considerable diagnostic power in 
detecting and classifying these new anomalies. The effectiveness of 
using entropy and dispersion metrics for capturing unusual changes 
resulting from these events has also been shown. This paper 
contributes the ability to visualise anomaly structures using the 
procedures presented by measuring distances to previously defined 
classes and pre-defined reference classes in a normalised hyperplane.  
Chauvenet has the limitation that it assumes an underlying normal 
distribution of the data. Future work will explore two main alternatives. 
The first is the application of clustering techniques (e.g. Streaming K 
means) to discover outliers. This technique presents the challenges of 
selecting the right number of clusters in an unbounded data set and, the 
right selection of the distance function (e.g. Eucledian, Mahalanobis). 
The second alternative is the application of autoregressive models (e.g. 
ARMA, ARIMA) to predict the next behaviour and detect the anomaly 
based on the discrepancy of the prediction with the reality.  
The methods presented in this paper are not restricted to the 
monitoring of traffic feature distributions. Currently the authors are 
investigating the application of this behavioural profiling procedure to 
the payload data of the producing IoT node. By focusing on sensed and 
reported data streams of an IoT node, we aim to classify supra-
communities of things based on a model of data-stream/content or 
topic-of-interest, for building on-the-fly communities.     
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